Why CVS Is Splitting Up, And Why Vertical Integration Survives

The announcement of the CVS breakup is not quite a breakup at all

On November 4, CVS Health announced that it will divide itself into two publicly traded companies by the first half of 2028. The headline reads as a reversal of two decades of vertical integration strategy, a walk back from the 2007 Caremark deal and the 2018 Aetna acquisition. Shareholders certainly read it that way, and the stock fell roughly 10 percent on the news.

But if you dig into the announcement itself, the headlines are actually a bit misleading. CVS is not abandoning vertical integration by any means. In fact, the proposal reinforces it. CVS actually is shedding the part of the integrated model that never fit quite well — the front-of-store retail pharmacy. It is keeping the part where the real economics of vertical integration success live — the insurer, the pharmacy benefit manager (PBM), specialty pharmacy, and owned care delivery. Again, my view is that in many respects the split concentrates vertical integration rather than dismantling it.

The Cordani precedent

Readers of this site will recall what I wrote about David Cordani, former CEO of Cigna. I described his decision to exit Medicare Advantage (MA) as close to omniscient timing as you can get. He sold the MA business and related assets to Health Care Service Corporation (HCSC) just before the segment’s economics deteriorated for nearly everyone who stayed. Cordani identified a business about to turn against its owners and handed it to someone else at a good price.

Is CVS CEO David Joyner being as prescient as Cordani was? Cordani left a line of business entirely, fearing future financial fallout. He also did so to concentrate on building out his Evernorth services business. Joyner is divesting certain vertically integrated assets, chiefly the retail and mail order pharmacies, while keeping the core of the integrated model intact.

What exactly goes where

Here are more details on the split. Two companies emerge, and one of them looks very much like the old CVS minus its stores.

  • CVS Health (the core insurer and PBM businesses): Aetna, CVS Caremark, CVS Specialty, Oak Street Health and Signify Health. Joyner remains chairman and CEO.
  • CVS Pharmacy (retail company): roughly 9,000 retail pharmacies, the mail-order pharmacy, MinuteClinic including virtual care, and the Health100 technology services business. Prem Shah, currently group president, becomes CEO.

The retail company is, in effect, a large dispensing and clinic network. The remaining CVS Health keeps the payer, the PBM, the specialty pharmacy that the PBM steers business toward, and the owned primary care and in-home assets that sit inside the insurer’s orbit.

Shareholders will own stock in both through what the company describes as a tax-free transaction. That is a key financial point.

Joyner said the pharmacy business has long operated behind a firewall and that the company does not need the integration in an operating structure. That sentence concedes the retail side contributed little operationally to the integrated model.

The financial logic

Retail pharmacy is a hard business to love financially. It is capital intensive, tied to thousands of leased storefronts, labor heavy, and exposed to reimbursement pressure from the very PBMs that dominate the rest of the industry. Front-of-store sales have been squeezed by online competition, and Amazon remains the benchmark CVS has struggled to match. Even when the pharmacy segment performs well, it tends to dilute the margin and growth profile of the whole enterprise over the long term.

That dilution has a price. A combined company carrying the Aetna acquisition debt and a sprawling retail footprint is valued as a blended hybrid, and the market rarely pays a premium multiple for hybrids. A pure-play insurer and PBM can be assessed against managed care peers. A pure-play pharmacy can be assessed against retail and distribution peers. Each can be given a capital structure suited to its own cash flows.

My read is that the split was engineered with two aims in mind:

  • Reduce the cost of debt: Separate balance sheets allow each entity to be financed and rated on its own risk profile, rather than forcing stable retail cash flows and volatile insurance earnings to share one credit story.
  • Maximize value to the succeeding shareholders. Joyner has said the plan comes from a position of strength, with Aetna’s Medicare business recovering and the stock up about 70 percent since he took over in October 2024. A company executes a split when the parts can be sold to investors at their best, not when it must.

The timing resembles Cordani’s logic again. Do the portfolio surgery while the patient is healthy, not once the market forces it.

Why keep specialty while shedding retail

The PBM, the insurer, and specialty pharmacy support one another and deliver the best of what vertical integration offers. Retail never did so in a meaningful way. That is the cleanest explanation for why CVS is keeping one pharmacy channel and releasing the other.

Specialty drugs account for about 2 to 3% of overall prescription volume but between 40% and 50% of drug dispensing revenue. CVS appears closer to 50%. Specialty is growing at a pace retail cannot approach, driven by high-priced branded therapies, biologics, and a pipeline of new launches. Retail volume is large and slow. Specialty volume is small and enormously valuable.

Specialty arrangements between PBMs and insurers are lucrative in two distinct ways:

  • Branded specialty: The PBM controls formulary placement, utilization management and network access, and can steer high-cost branded drugs to its own affiliated specialty pharmacy. The insurer’s members become the captive patient population, often at the expense of their pocketbook.
  • Specialty generics and PBM-created products: This is where the markups become striking. When a PBM’s own pharmacy dispenses a specialty generic, the PBM sets reimbursement, owns the dispensing margin and often controls the private-label or co-branded product itself. Biosimilars and house-brand arrangements offer the same opportunity.

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has put numbers on this. It found that 22 percent of specialty generics dispensed by the largest PBMs’ own pharmacies were marked up more than 1,000 percent over acquisition cost. Those are not retail economics. They are the product of a PBM, an insurer and a pharmacy all sitting under one roof, which is precisely what remains at CVS Health after the split.

So, the logic is consistent. Specialty reinforces vertical integration. Retail, in any way that mattered financially, did not.

Owned doctors and the medical loss ratio

One further asset deserves attention. Oak Street Health and Signify Health stay with the insurer. Owned physicians and care delivery inside the overall healthcare entity create the same kind of opportunity that specialty creates on the pharmacy side: a way to earn revenue downstream of the minimum medical loss ratio (MLR) requirements.

The MLR rules require insurers to spend a set share of premium dollars on medical care and quality improvement, which limits how much they can retain as administrative cost and profit. But when premium dollars are paid to an owned provider group, the insurer books them as medical expense, satisfying the ratio, while the enterprise still captures the margin the provider earns. The same dollar counts toward compliance at the insurer and as profit at the provider. Owned doctors also influence referral patterns, coding intensity and care steering, all of which feed back into plan performance.

Recap

So, Joyner’s retained portfolio at the insurer-PBM unit is extremely coherent and reinforces vertical integration strategies. The insurer supplies members, the PBM controls drug benefit design, specialty pharmacy captures the highest-margin dispensing, and owned providers capture margin on the care itself. Retail pharmacy, by contrast, was a low-margin channel that added little to this loop due to what Joyner characterized as a firewall.

More to the point, the new CVS minus retail drugs actually looks more and more like the other vertical entities – UnitedHealth Group and Cigna. Elevance, too, is investing heavily in Carelon.

The politics: A bet on where the line gets drawn

There is an immediate political threat behind the financial rationale as well. States including Arkansas and Tennessee have passed laws aimed at barring a single corporate family from owning both a PBM and pharmacies. Tennessee’s law is already the subject of a lawsuit CVS filed challenging its constitutionality. The simple reading is that Joyner is responding to those state laws, and the split is the cleanest way to comply without losing the PBM. He is looking forward. He was one of the only big vertical entities with a PBM to have the problem. UnitedHealthcare and Cigna do not.

But the split is also a wager on federal politics. Joyner appears to be counting on a consensus, spanning Democrats and the Trump administration, that the target of reform is the pharmacy and PBM combination. If legislation arrives in the form most commonly proposed, which separates dispensing from benefit management, CVS will have already done what Congress requires.

The risk is that the target moves. Reformers could just as easily attack the combination of plans, PBMs and specialty pharmacy, the very structure that survives the split. A PBM that steers members to its own specialty pharmacy, owned by the same parent as the insurer, is the most obvious source of the markups the FTC documented. If lawmakers define the problem as conflicts of interest across the pharmaceutical supply chain, instead of ownership of storefronts, the retained CVS Health sits squarely in the line of fire along with United, Cigna, Elevance and others.

The vertically integrated entities will invest heavily in stopping the lucrative vertical deals from being broken up. Democrats want to go after such entities. While the White House is deemed pro-business, the president has been known to attack big insurers as these organizations are known.

Conclusion: reinforcement, not retreat

So, despite what the headlines say, CVS is not truly getting rid of vertical integration. It is reinforcing it. By releasing the retail stores, Joyner removes the weakest link in the chain, lowers the political temperature around storefront ownership, and offers investors two cleaner stories. What remains is the integrated core: insurer, PBM, specialty pharmacy and owned care delivery, the assets that generate the most profitable cross-subsidies.

Joyner is reacting to an immediate threat from state laws that bar common ownership of pharmacies and PBMs, and to a simple financial rationale about debt costs and valuation. As well, he is making a political bet that vertical integration will on the whole remain perhaps with some cosmetic concessions (such as some arms-length financial requirements and transparency). But we know that Democrats and maybe Donald Trump will be coming after vertical integration just the same. Joyner is taking a calculated risk.

#healthplans #pbms #verticalintegration

— Marc S. Ryan

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